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This paper analyzes an optimal antitrust policy on horizontal mer- 
gers under asymmetric information when antitrust agency cannot 
observe the post-merger private cost of merged firms. By using a 
discrete mechanism design approach with self-selection, this paper 
proposes an incentive compatible lump-sum tax scheme to provide 
an efficient decision on whether the application for merger should 
be accepted or rejected. Results show that the optimal size of lump- 
sum tax is not affected by the informational rent of private post- 
merger cost information of merged firms.
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I. Introduction
The level of merger activity is an important factor affecting the market 
structure throughout the last century. Horizontal mergers between large 
firms can have significant effects on the structure of industries with 
imperfect competition. In particular, anti-competitive horizontal mergers 
can increase the market power of monopolistic firms and affect seriously 
the efficiency of the market. In his seminal paper, Williamson (1968) 
points out that modest cost savings from horizontal mergers often result 
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in increased social welfare. Therefore, a continuing debate exists as to 
whether mergers generally promote greater efficiency or greater market 
power.
The United States Department of Justice has issued its first set of 
merger guidelines in 1968. The guidelines are created to help reduce 
uncertainties regarding the legality or illegality of mergers. New guidelines 
have been released in 1982 and revised in 1984. Compared with the 1968 
guidelines, the 1982 guidelines have left relatively few mergers open for 
challenge. Furthermore, the 1984 guidelines explicitly recognize the rel- 
evance of efficiency gains in the decision-making process of a department. 
However, these guidelines are not for the absolute defense of departments, 
but can only be denoted as a factor to be considered before making the 
final decision. In 1992, the guidelines have been revised again to em- 
phasize further the influence of mergers on price and entry condition.1
Previous theoretical literature on horizontal mergers can be divided 
into three trends. The first trend involves the traditional approach on 
the profit and welfare effect of horizontal mergers under complete infor- 
mation. Perry and Porter (1985) propose a model of horizontal mergers 
between two Cournot duopolies, in which each firm has the same con- 
stant average cost, while McAfee and Williams (1992) consider a model 
in which firms have different costs. Kabiraj and Lee (2003) create a three- 
firm model with asymmetric costs and portrayed situations where firms 
fail to merge into grand coalition. Farrell and Shapiro (1990) and Levin 
(1990) also contribute to the research on merger policy as to whether 
merger activity under complete information should be prohibited. Andrade 
et al. (2001), Whinston (2006), and Choi (2007) present an analysis on 
horizontal merger, providing the empirical works and practical sides of 
the antitrust law.
The second trend includes recent policy intervention on remedies in- 
stead of outright prohibition. Merger activity is shaped by self-selection 
on participating firms that believe their merger can pass scrutiny and 
can generate sufficient benefits to brave the regulatory process. Leveque 
and Shelanski (2003) document evidence on remedied mergers in the 
United States and the European Union since 1990. Verge (2010) considers 
1 The European Union (EU) merger control regulation has adopted an analytic 
framework similar to the United States (US) merger guidelines. For example, the 
EU guidelines report that any merger that will significantly impede effective com- 
petition in the common market or in a substantial part of it should be block- 
aded, whereas the US guidelines report that mergers are prohibited if they would 
result in a substantial lessening of competition.
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the structural remedies of divesture of assets under Cournot oligopoly and 
Vasconcelos (2010) extended Verge’s analysis by focusing on endogenous 
mergers to increase consumer’s surplus.
The third trend approaches on the incentive issue of  merger policies 
under incomplete information. Merging firms usually have better infor- 
mation on prospective cost savings than the antitrust authority does. 
Lagerlof and Heidhues (2005) consider the asymmetric information where 
two firms that have proposed to merge are privately informed about 
merger-specific efficiencies, and analyze the strategic behavior of firms 
when revealing information to an antitrust authority Cosnita and Tropeano 
(2009) also consider the efficiency gains in the design of structural re- 
medies when antitrust authority does not observe the magnitude of ef- 
ficiency gains. 
Our paper is closely related to the last approach under incomplete 
information. We take a discrete version of mechanism design when the 
private information about post-merger cost is present.2 On the basis of 
Williamson’s argument, we focus on the fact that cost saving can be 
used to justify anti-competitive horizontal mergers only if the increase 
in social welfare from the merger exceeds a positive threshold that de- 
pends on the quality of the information on cost savings given to the gov- 
ernment. Besanko and Spulber (1993) examine the enforcement process 
of antitrust policy under the guideline for consumer’s surplus and in- 
dicate that filling fees for pre-merger notification can deter marginally 
profitable mergers. By using self-selection property in a mechanism de- 
sign process, this article provides a detailed analysis on efficient lump- 
sum tax, which can induce welfare-improving horizontal merger under 
asymmetric information when an antitrust agency cannot observe the 
post-merger cost of merged firms. The proposed incentive merger tax 
provides the efficient decisions of antitrust policy, which is not affected 
by the informational rent of the private cost information of merged firms 
at the post-merger cost level. 
The organizational structure of this paper is as follows: Section II 
considers the basic model on horizontal merger policy under complete 
information and provides an optimal decision whether to allow or reject 
horizontal mergers. Section III analyzes the case of asymmetric infor- 
2 Laffont and Martimort (2002) provide the revelation principle in the general 
theory of incentives for a continuous decision model. Mitchell and Moro (2006) 
and Lee (2010) propose an incentive mechanism for a discrete decision model of 
trade policy and privatization policy, respectively.
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mation in which the antitrust agency cannot observe the post-merger 
private cost of the merged firm. An optimal decision mechanism on hori- 
zontal merger is also proposed in this section. Section IV extends the 
analysis of the basic model into practical discussions on adjusted welfare 
standard and partial merger in a Cournot oligopoly with more than three 
firms. Section V provides the conclusion.
II. Optimal Merger Policy with Complete Information
We will consider the simplified version of Williamson’s model on hori- 
zontal mergers in which the trade-off between market power and pro- 
duction efficiency gains from merger is illustrated. We assume that the 
pre-merger market consists of a duopoly, of which products are homo- 
geneous, and that two competitors are going to merge to form a monopoly. 
Without considering the fixed cost, pre-merger marginal production cost 
is assumed the same and constant at c0 for both firms, and the post- 
merger marginal cost is constant at c1. Cost-savings arises if c0＞c1 or δ
≡c0－c1＞0. Note that keeping the status quo is considered as the op- 
timal antitrust policy when there is the same cost between pre- and post- 
mergers. Therefore, we assume that a costs saving effect provides interior 
solutions and reasonable decisions on the optimal policy.
Inverse market demand function is given by P＝P(Q), which is an in- 
variant between pre-merger and post-merger. The pre-merger price is 
assumed P0≥c0, in which two competing firms earn non-negative profit 
in the market. Let us define pre-merger consumer’s surplus as CS0＝
                  , where Q0 is the pre-merger market output level that 
is produced by two firms. The pre-merger social welfare, which is the 
sum of consumer’s surplus and industry profits, π0, is W0＝CS0＋π0.
Let us now examine the post-merger market performance. After merger, 
the monopolist will maximize the merged profit, π (Q1)＝P(Q1)Q1－c1Q1. 
The profit-maximizing output level of the monopolist can be defined as 
Q1(c1), that is, the post-merger market output level is the function of 
post-merger cost c1. Thus, the resulting post-merger profit can be also 
defined as a function of c1, π (C1). The resulting post-merger consumer’s 











P v dv∫ －c1Q(c1), respectively. Let us define the changes 
of industry profit, consumer’s surplus, and welfare between pre-merger 
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The following are the properties of the post-merger market performance, 
which include industry profit, consumer’s surplus, and welfare. First, 
the outputs and profits of the merged firm are decreasing functions of 
post-merger cost,3 that is, (∂Q1/∂c1)＜0 and (∂π/∂c1)＜0. Therefore, if 
the post-merger cost increases, then the merged firm reduces its output, 
which results in reduced profit. Second, consumer’s surplus and welfare 
after merger are decreasing functions of the post-merger cost, that is, 
(∂CS(c1)/∂c1)＜0 and (∂W(c1)/∂c1)＜0. Therefore, if the post-merger cost 
increases, then the output of the merged firm decreases, which results 
in decreased consumer’s surplus. Aside from the decrease in profit of 
the merged firm if the post-merger cost increases, social welfare also 
decreases. Changes in consumer’s surplus and welfare between pre- 
merger and post-merger are decreasing functions of post-merger cost, 
that is, (∂ΔCS/∂c1)＜0 and (∂ΔW/∂c1)＜0. Given that consumer’s surplus 
and welfare after merger is a decreasing function of post-merger cost 
and it does not affect the performance of pre-merger, consumer’s surplus 
and the welfare between pre-merger and post-merger decrease as post- 
merger cost increases.
By using the abovementioned properties, we can determine the useful 
relations between cost level and changes in welfare, thus providing an 
optimal decision on antitrust policy (Figure 1). Let c* denote the cost 
level of c1, which makes ΔW＝0, that is, W(c*)＝W0. Thus, C*≤C0.4 There- 
fore, the monotonicity of ΔW in terms of c1 denotes that the merger is 
welfare-decreasing if c1＞c
*, whereas the merger is welfare-increasing if 
c1＜c
*. Specifically, if c1＜c
*, the post-merger production efficiency is 
greater than the increase of post-merger welfare loss. 
Let c** denote the cost level of c1, which makes ΔCS＝0, that is, ΔQ＝
ΔP＝0. We can show that c*＞c**. Therefore, the monotonicity of ΔCS in 
terms of c1 gives the conclusion that if c1＜c
**, then the merger in- 
creases the consumer’s surplus. This condition is Pareto-improving to 
both consumers and the two firms. However, if c**≤0, then the merger 
always reduces the consumer’s surplus.
Consider the optimal decision on horizontal merger, which either allows 
or rejects the horizontal merger. Let P(c*)＝P*, Q(c*)＝Q*, and π (c*)＝π *. 
Then, the optimal antitrust policy under complete information determines 
that R0＝{0≤c1≤c
*} is for the “allowing” region and R1＝{c
*≤c1≤c0} is for 
the “rejection” region. Therefore, the post-merger welfare increases only 
3 Proofs are provided in Appendix I.
4 If not, Q1(c
*)＜Q0. Thus, W(c
*)＜W0 always holds, which is a contradiction. 
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FIGURE 1
OPTIMAL MERGER POLICY WITH COMPLETE INFORMATION
if a cost savings effect is sufficiently high.
III. Optimal Merger Policy with Incomplete Information
We now examine the problem of asymmetric information when the 
antitrust agency has certain information on pre-merger, but no infor- 
mation on post-merger. In particular, we assume that the pre-merger 
market demand and price-cost margin are public information, but the 
post-merger cost level of the monopolist is private information.5 The 
agency can calculate c*, which is the threshold level of antitrust policy, 
from public information, such as c0 and P(Q). After the agency obtains 
the post-merger cost information on c1, where c1 becomes public, then 
the agency can determine the optimal policy on the basis of the values 
of c1 and c
*, as discussed in Section 2.
We model the optimal antitrust policies on horizontal merger under 
incomplete information. The agency offers the firm whether to apply the 
5 The assumption that the agency has information on pre-merger market de- 
mand (market price P0, price elasticity on demand η, and market share si＝qi/Q0) 
gives the cost information on c0. Specifically, from the inverse elasticity rule for 
price-cost margin P0{1－(si/η)}＝c0, we can obtain the cost information from c0.
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FIGURE 2
OPTIMAL MERGER POLICY WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
merger. Then, the agency chooses m＝0 (allow merger) or m＝1 (reject 
merger). When the agency allow the merger, the merger can impose a 
lump-sum tax to the firm. This optimal tax policy has decentralized 
form, which can be formulated as a mechanism design: the firm reports 
ĉ1, which is based on the private information on c1. As a function of the 
report, the agency imposes a tax t(ĉ1) and policy m(ĉ1), which is 0 or 1.
Specifically, in the discrete optimal mechanism, the agency chooses 
the following lump-sum tax and decision on antitrust policy:6 for any  
ĉ1＞c
*, the merger will be allowed (m＝0) and a lump-sum tax t*＝π (c*)－
π0 will be levied. Otherwise, for any ĉ1＞c*, the merger will be rejected 
(m＝1).
For a given report of ĉ1, the net profit of the merged firm with post- 
merger cost of c1 is defined as π (ĉ1, c1)＝π (c1)－π (c*)＋π0 if ĉ1≤c* and π
( ĉ1, c1)＝π0 if ĉ1≤c*. In Appendix II, we show that the proposed optimal 
policy with incomplete information achieves efficient decision with com- 
plete information. In Appendix III, we show that the proposed optimal 
tax is a unique incentive mechanism, which maximizes the tax revenue 
6 Without decision policy on allowing or rejection, m, the single decision on 
optimal lump-sum tax can be determined as t＝M for any ĉ1＞c
*, where M is a 
sufficiently large number that gives negative profit to the merged firm. I appre- 
ciate the comments of an anonymous referee regarding these points.
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under incomplete information. 
The following remarks should be considered. First, for any c1, π (ĉ1, 
c1)≥π0, which guarantees that the merged firm is no worse off than the 
status quo m＝1; this scenario satisfies the individual rationality (IR) 
constraint. Second, the firm has no incentive for reporting a false cost, 
which switches the decision to the other decision region; this scenario 
satisfies the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint of the truth-telling 
property. Finally, the proposed mechanism provides the agency with an 
efficient decision on the merger policy, which increases post-merger social 
welfare. Therefore, the lump-sum tax mechanism achieves the same 
efficiency level with complete information. Therefore, information rent 
does not influence the threshold for the optimal merger decision under 
incomplete information. 
Figure 2 illustrates the optimal merger policy on m＝0 for R0 if c1≤c
* 
and on m＝1 for R1 if c1＞c
*. We now review the properties of the optimal 
incentive tax mechanism with incomplete information. First, for the dis- 
crete choice on m, a threshold exists where the optimal choice divides 
the range of c1 with the allowing range R0 and status quo range R1. In 
particular, m＝0 when c1≤c
*, and m＝1 when c1≤c
*. The low values of 
c1 is the allowing range, whereas the high values of c1 is the status quo 
range. Therefore, the optimal policy choice m(c1) is non-decreasing in 
c1.
Second, the optimal tax is lump-sum and is non-discriminatory on the 
post-merger cost level whenever the policy choice is constant. In par- 
ticular, the amount of lump-sum tax in R0 is exactly equal to the in- 
creasing profit level when the post-merger cost is at the threshold, that 
is, c1＝c
*. Therefore, the truth-telling cost information obtains positive 
profits when c1＜c
*; an informational rent exists for the efficient cost 
level under asymmetric information.
IV. Extensions and Discussions
　
A. Consumer’s Surplus Standard Versus Welfare Standard
Some of the major antitrust agencies in charge of merger control appear 
to operate with objectives that differ from that of welfare maximization. 
According to Neven and Roller (2005), both US and EU merger controls 
can be interpreted as maximizing consumer’s surplus rather than ag- 
gregate welfare.7 The welfare implications of consumer’s surplus standard 
will be welfare-enhancing results rather than welfare standard because 
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the post-merger profit will be always increasing. 
By using the basic framework in the previous section, we can apply 
the guideline with consumer’s surplus, instead of that with social welfare. 
We will re-define the adjusted welfare with the weights on consumers 
surplus as W＝CS＋απ , where 0≤α≤1. Notice that (pure) welfare stand- 
ard implies α＝1, whereas (pure) consumer’s surplus standard implies 
α＝0. Let cs denote the cost level of c1, which makes ΔW＝0, that is, 
W(cs)＝W0. From the decreasing properties of welfare and consumer’s 
surplus, we have c**≤cs≤c*. 
Similar to the guideline in the previous section, we can formulate the 
changed set of merger policy with lump-sum tax as follows: for any ĉ1≤
cs, the merger will be allowed (m＝0) and the lump-sum tax ts＝π (cs)－
π0 will be levied. Otherwise, for any ĉ1＞c
s, the merger will be rejected 
(m＝1). 
We can apply Appendix II to prove that the proposed policy can achieve 
an efficient decision with complete information. Welfare will increase 
under the adjusted welfare standard, compared with the (pure) welfare 
standard. Lump-sum tax will also increase under the changed set of 
merger policies.
　
B. Cournot oligopoly with more than three firms
We will extend the traditional homogeneous product model of Cournot 
oligopoly with more than three firms. According to Kabiraj and Lee (2003), 
even though monopolization through merger will maximize industry pro- 
fits by avoiding competition, firms may not successfully create a grand 
coalition (such as industrial monopoly) when more than three firms with 
asymmetric cost are present. As pointed out by Salant et al. (1983), 
however, a partial merger by a specific number of firms causes losses; 
that is, some exogenous mergers between sub-firms in an industry may 
reduce the endogenous joint profits of the merged firms because the 
reduced number of firms in Cournot competition would give an incentive 
to reduce its production. Therefore, a threshold on whether firms have 
an incentive to merge when cost savings arise should be available. This 
threshold might provide under-incentive to merge, even though the merger 
increases welfare.
7 Consumer’s surplus standard is most plausible to the antitrust agency and 
consumers in the political economy environment. On the arguments on different 
standards between consumer’s surplus and social welfare, see Besanko and 
Spulber (1993) and Neven and Roller (2005), among others.
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In this subsection, we will consider a partial merger, in which only 
two firms merge into one firm among oligopolists with more than three 
firms. When a merger achieves cost-saving, that is, c0＞c1 or d≡c0－c1＞
0, we will examine the under-incentive of merged firms and construct a 
merger policy with lump-sum tax (or subsidy) for this situation. 
For the sake of simplicity, we assume a linear demand function in 
which P＝a－bQ and N(≥3) firms compete with Cournot fashion in a 
pre-merger period. From the first-order conditions for profit maximiza- 
tion, we have q0＝(a－c0)/{b(N＋1)} and Q0＝Nq0＝{N(a－c0)}/{b(N＋1)}. Here, 





( )P v dv P , the firm profits 
as π0＝(a－c0)
2/{b(N＋1)2}, and social welfare as W0＝CS0＋Nπ0＝{N(N＋
2)(a－c0)
2}/{2b(N＋1)2} in a pre-merger situation.
Next, we consider the change of market concentration after a merger 
occurs between two firms among N firms. N－1 firms exist in the market, 
in which N－2 firms have the same production cost at c0, and a merged 
firm m has a cost of c1, where c0＞c1. Assuming that second-order con- 
ditions are satisfied, the first-order conditions for profit maximization 
provide the following relations:
　
Q
− −= = = − +1 1 1 1 1
1
and ( 2) ,o m
m
P c P cb N q q
q q
where q1 denotes the individual outputs of N－2 firms, and qm denotes 
the outputs of the merged firm at equilibrium. Calculations yield 
Q
δ δ δ− − − + − − − += = =0 0 01 1
( 1) ( 1)( ), , and .m
a c a c N N a cq q
bN bN bN
Notice that q0＜qm＝q1＜2q0 if δ＝0. Notice also that N－1 Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium outputs8 are defined as a function of c1; ∂q1/∂c1＞0, where- 
as ∂qm/∂c1＜0 and ∂Q1/∂c1＜0. 
The following remarks should be considered. First, the profits of the 
merged firm is 
8 We assume that d＜a－c0 for ensuring N－1 positive Cournot-Nash equilib- 
rium outputs, where N－1 firms exist at post-merger equilibrium. Otherwise, 
merged firms will monopolize the entire market because post-merger cost is 
sufficiently lower than the cost of N－2 firms. Thus, the monopoly price of the 
merged firm is lower than the equilibrium price of N－1 firms.
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2
2
( ( 1)) .om
a c N
bN
δπ − + −=
The profit of the merged firm is a decreasing function of its post-merger 
cost, ∂π m/∂c1＜0 and ∂Δπ m/∂c1＜0, where Δπ m＝π m－2π0. Notice that 




( )( 2 1) or ,
1
a c N N c c
N
αδ − − −≥ ≤
−  
                  where   
Given that ∂Δπ m/∂c1＜0, c
α represents a threshold of private incentive 
on whether a merger between two firms will increase their profits. There- 
fore, contrary to the duopoly case, a small amount of cost saving does 
not provide any incentive to mergers when more than three firms exist 
in a Cournot oligopoly.
Second, given that ∂Q1/∂c1＜0, consumer’s surplus after merger is a 
decreasing function of post-merger cost, {∂CS(c1)/∂c1}＜0; that is, the cost- 
saving effect of a horizontal merger is always beneficial to consumer’s 
surplus.
Third, welfare after merger is 
Q
= − − −∫
1 1( )
1 0 1 1 1 10
( ) ( ) ( 2) ( ) ( ).
c
mW c P v dv N c q c c q c
We have 
Q Q
∂ ∂ ∂= − − + − − <
∂ ∂ ∂
1 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 1
( ) ( 2)( ( ) ) ( ( ) ) 0.m m
W c q qN P c P c q
c c c
Thus, welfare after merger is a decreasing function of post-merger cost, 
and the change of welfare is also a decreasing function of post-merger 
cost,∂ΔW/∂c1＜0. We let c
β denote the cost level of c1, which makes ΔW
＝0, that is, W(c
β)＝W0. Given that∂ΔW/∂c1＜0, c
β represents a thresh- 




( )( 2 1) .
1
a c N Nc c
N
α − − −= −
−
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Finally, we have obtained two cases by comparing two different (private 
and public) incentives between cα and cβ.9 On the one hand, if cα≥cβ, 
private incentives for mergers are not socially beneficial. Therefore, we 
can apply the set of merger policies with lump-sum tax as follows: for 
any  ĉ1≤c
β, the merger will be allowed (m＝0) and lump-sum tax tβ＝ 
π m(c
β )－2π0 will be levied. Otherwise, the merger will be rejected (m＝1). 
On the other hand, if c
α≥cβ, then private incentives for mergers are in- 
sufficient to achieve the social optimum, compared with public incentives. 
Thus, the set of merger policies should be accompanied with lump-sum 
subsidy as follows: for any ĉ1≤c
β, the merger will be allowed (m＝0) and 
the lump-sum subsidy sβ＝2π0－π m(c
β ) will be subsidized. Otherwise, the 
merger will be rejected (m＝1).
V. Conclusion
The existing guidelines of antitrust policy on horizontal merger are 
insufficient and incomplete. In practice, both EU and US guidelines are 
aware of the importance of efficiency gains in horizontal mergers and 
denote efficiency gains as a factor to be considered before making final 
decisions. By using self-selection property in a mechanism design, we 
have provided an efficient tax scheme for horizontal merger policies under 
asymmetric information when an agency cannot observe the post-merger 
private cost of merged firms. Specifically, we have proposed an incentive 
lump-sum tax, which is not affected by informational rent at the post- 
merger cost level. We believe that this mechanism provides guideline for 
the substantial lessening of efficiency gain when competition authorities 
formulate the policy process on antitrust law. 
However, the mechanism design problem analyzed in this paper is 
static Bayesian approach, in which an agency has the ability to commit 
to a policy as a function of the cost of the merged firm. Some extensions 
to more general models featuring dynamics and strategic interactions in 
oligopolistic competition before and after mergers may be amenable to 
future analysis. On the one hand, under the suggested taxation mech- 
anism, the antitrust agency must have almost all relevant information 
about demand, pre-merger cost, and pre-merger price, excluding post- 
merger cost. Some practical implication on how an agency can collect 
the pre-information and link this information to post-information (with 
9 Appendix II can be applied to prove that the proposed policy can achieve the 
efficient decision with complete information.
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Bayesian manner) should be scrutinized to construct efficient taxation 
policies. On the other hand, considering an extension of asymmetric com- 
petition model that includes not only market concentrations among firms 
but also different types of competition with leadership or differentiated 
products is challenging. From the perspective of monetary transfer in 
the tax system, some justification of the use of such transfer, which 
will go to the government, should also be examined.
Finally, an analysis should be conducted by using more practical and 
political arguments to obtain general and practical policy implications. 
The present merger control in Europen Union and United States utilizes 
different instruments including efficiency defense and remedies.10 For 
example, the efficiency defense with behavioral remedies, which enable 
firms to argue the efficiency gains, should be high enough to ensure a 
price decrease, as pointed out by Lagerlof and Heidhues (2005), Motta 
and Vasconcelos (2005), and Banal-Estanol et al. (2010). Structural re- 
medies (asset divestitures) should also result in a price decrease, as dis- 
cussed by Cosnita and Tropeano (2009), Verge (2010), and Vasconcelos 
(2010). 
(Received 7 November 2012; Revised 4 January 2013; Accepted 5 
February 2013)
Appendix I 
The first-order and second-order conditions of profit maximization 
problem obtain the following results: 
Q Q
Q Q
π π∂ ∂′ ′′ ′= + − = = + <
∂ ∂
2
1 20 and 2 0.P P c P P




π π∂ ∂ ∂= − <
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
2 2
2/ 0c c
10 Merger remedies can be classified into two different groups: behavioral and 
structural remedies. Behavioral remedies set constraints on the property rights 
of merged firms to enter into specific contractual arrangement. Structural remedies 
with divestitures modify the allocation of property rights and create new firms.
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when the second-order condition is applied. From the profit-maximization 








when the first-order condition is applied.
Appendix II
Under the lump-sum tax policy, the net profit of the merged firm for 
a given report of ĉ1 is described as follows:
π (ĉ1, c1)＝π (c1)－t  if  ĉ1≤c* and π (ĉ1, c1)＝π0 if  ĉ1≤c*.
On the one hand, if the firm applies for merger when c1≤c
*, then the 
firm has no incentive to report ĉ1≤c
*. If the firm reports a false cost, 
then the agency chooses m＝1 and the merger will be rejected, which 
yields π0. However, the firm can earn more profits by reporting ĉ1≤c*. 
On the other hand, if the firm applies for merger when c1≤c
* and report 
ĉ1≤c
*, then the agency chooses m＝0. Given that tax will be imposed to 
the firm, the firm has negative profit, that is, π (c1)－π (c*)＜0.
Appendix III
First, the optimal tax should be considered a constant in each policy 
range. If not, the firm has an incentive to misreport the cost level, which 
can lower the tax level under the same decision on m. Therefore, the 
amount to be taxed must be equal in each policy range. Second, the 
optimal tax level under m＝1 should be equal to zero, as long as the 
two firms earn non-negative profit in the pre-merger market. Otherwise, 
the optimal tax level cannot satisfy the IR constraint. Finally, the optimal 
tax level under m＝0 should be equal to π (c*)－π0, which is the maxi- 
mized tax level when c1＝c
*. If the optimal tax level is greater than π (c*)
－π0, then the optimal tax level will violate the IR constraint. If a tax 
level is lower than π (c*)－π0, then the agency can increase the tax level 
without violating the IR constraint.
 AN OPTIMAL INCENTIVE TAX POLICY ON HORIZONTAL MERGERS 253
References
Andrade, G. M. Mitchell, and E. Stafford. “New Evidence and Perspectives 
on Mergers.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 15 (No. 1 2001): 
103-20.
Banal-Estanol, A., P. Heidhues, R. Nitsche, and J. Seldeslachts. 
“Screening and Merger Activity.” Journal of Industrial Economics 
58 (No. 4 2010): 794-816.
Besanko, D. and D. F. Spulber. “Contested Mergers and Equilibrium 
Antitrust Policy.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 9 
(No. 1 1993): 1-29.
Choi, J. P. Recent Developments in Antitrust. Massachusetts: The MIT 
Press, December, 2006. 
Cosnita, A., and J. P. Tropeano. “Negotiating Remedies: Revealing the 
Merger Efficiency Gains.” International Journal of Industrial 
Organization 27 (No. 2 2009): 188-96.
Farrell, J., and C. Shapiro. “Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium 
Analysis.” American Economic Review 80 (No. 1 1990): 107-26.
Kabiraj, T., and C. C. Lee. “Technological Asymmetry, Externality, and 
Merger: The Case of a Three-Firm Industry.” Seoul Journal of 
Economics 16 (No. 1 2003): 1-22.
Laffont, J. J., and D. Martimort. The Theory of Incentives: The Principal- 
Agent Model. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002. 
Lagerlof, J., and P. Heidhues. “On the Desirability of an Efficiency 
Defense in Merger Control.” International Journal of Industrial 
Organization 23 (No. 9 2005): 803-27.
Lee, S. H. “Optimal Privatization Policy under Asymmetric Information.” 
Korean Journal of Industrial Organization 18 (No. 3 2010): 59-78. 
Leveque, F., and H. Shelanski. Merger Remedies in American and 
European Union Competition Law. Great Britain: Edward Elgar 
Publisher, January, 2004. 
Levin, D. “Horizontal Mergers: The 50-Percent Benchmark.” American 
Economic Review 80 (No. 5 1990): 1238-45.
McAfee, P., and M. A. Williams. “Horizontal Mergers and Antitrust Policy” 
Journal of Industrial Economics 40 (No. 2 1992): 181-86. 
Mitchell, M. F., and A. Moro. “Persistent Distortionary Policies with 
Asymmetric Information.” American Economic Review 96 (No. 1 
2006): 387-93.
Motta, M., and H. Vasconcelos. “Efficiency Gains and Myopic Antitrust 
SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS254
Authority in a Dynamic Merger Game.” International Journal of 
Industrial Organization 23 (No. 9 2005): 777-801.
Neven, D., and L. Roller. “Consumer Surplus vs. Welfare Standard in a 
Political Economy Model of Merger Control.” International Journal 
of Industrial Organization 23 (No. 9 2005): 829-48.
Perry, M. K., and R. H. Porter. “Oligopoly and the Incentive for Horizontal 
Merger.” American Economic Review 75 (No. 1 1985): 219-27.
Salant, S. W., S. Switzer, and R. J. Reynolds. “Losses from Horizontal 
Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure 
on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium.” Quartely Journal of Economics 48 
(No. 2 1983): 185-99. 
Vasconcelos, H. “Efficiency Gains and Structural Remedies in Merger 
Control.” Journal of Industrial Economics 58 (No. 4 2010): 742- 
66.
Verge. “Horizontal Mergers, Structural Remedies and Consumer Welfare 
in a Cournot Oligopoly with Assets.” Journal of Industrial Economics 
58 (No. 4 2010): 723-41.
Whinston, M. D. Lectures on Antitrust Economics. The MIT Press, 2006. 
Williamson, O. “Economics as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare 
Tradeoffs.” American Economic Review 58 (No. 1 1968): 18-36.
